This article discusses how interactive media threaten informational privacy, especially in a legal environment that fails to protect individuals' right to receive and use content without being scrutinized by private and government institutions.The article observes that as information about media consumption habits make up an increasingly large share of the stock of data that institutions can use in order to make inferences about individuals, it becomes increasingly more difficult for individuals to determine which types of behaviors would cause them to be assigned to a high-risk category. In the light of this observation, the article concludes by proposing that in order to address the uncertainty that individuals face in trying to figure out how institutions use personal information to categorize them into different risk groups, a privacy protection scheme that increases the accountability of these automated and manual interpretation processes is needed.
INTRODUCTION
Khalid is a Lebanese graduate student studying biochemistry at the University of Pennsylvania. He is on his way to Los Angeles to present, for the first time, a paper at an international conference. He arrives at the Philadelphia International Airport three hours before his flight, checks his baggage and heads on to the gate. At the security check, the metal clip on his belt prompts the metal detector's alarm. An officer points him to a chair and tells him to sit there and take his shoes off.What happens next, however, is not something Khalid would have expected: another officer approaches him and asks for his identification. Khalid gives the officer his passport and the officer leaves with the passport. After 30 minutes, the officer comes back with a printout in his hand and asks Khalid to follow him to an office at the end of the corridor.
Of course, while answering the officer's questions, Khalid has no idea what has gone wrong. Although he cannot see the highlighted sections of the printout that the officer has, Khalid realizes that the officer knows very intimate details about him (even Khalid can't remember some of these details) and that he is considered a high-risk flyer. Based on the questions that the officer asks him, Khalid can guess the possible reasons why he was detained: he is a Middle Eastern biochemistry student who has been a frequent user of Middle Eastern news websites such as Al Jazeera and whose recent book purchases from Amazon.com include a book about the use of telecommunication devices to avoid being arrested in large-scale protests. Of course, the database does not show that he decided to become a biochemistry student after he lost his brother to leukemia. Similarly, the database does not show that the book he purchased about the use of telecommunication devices in large protests was a gift to his girlfriend who is studying different uses of cellular phones.
This hypothetical story underlines two important points about how institutions use personal information. First, as many commentators have noted, contemporary surveillance systems increasingly rely on personal information in order to make inferences about individuals without taking into consideration the contextual integrity of the available information (Lessig, 1999; Nissenbaum, 1998; Phillips, 2002; Rosen, 2000) . Second, especially with the penetration of the internet, as well as other types of digital and/or interactive media, such as personal video recorders (PVR) and video on demand, information about individuals' media consumption habits make up an increasingly large share of the stock of data that institutions compile about individuals.This is largely due to the architecture of interactive media, which makes collecting data about individuals' media use habits considerably easier than collecting data about individuals' use of more traditional forms of media.
Given these changes, this article argues that a facet of privacy that will increasingly be threatened by the interactive media's ability to facilitate two-way information flow is the right to private inquiry: the rights to read, watch, listen and think without being subject to unwarranted scrutiny and interference of others.This argument has already been made by Cohen (1996) , who focused on how digital copyright management technologies implicate freedom to read and proposed that congress develop a comprehensive legislation to protect individuals' right to read anonymously.This article will add to Cohen's important contribution not only by summarizing the ways in which individuals' media consumption habits are scrutinized for purposes other than copyright management, but also by contending that the increased scrutiny of individuals' media consumption habits over interactive media extends the possible uses and users of personal information. As the example above suggests, this extension in the possible uses and users of personal information makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to determine which actions may induce institutions to further scrutinize them or interfere with their behavior. In the light of this observation, this article will suggest that concepts such as the chilling effect of surveillance, despite their value in explaining how privacy protects democratic values, do not provide a sufficient framework to understand the value of privacy.This article also proposes that as it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to determine which behaviors would trigger further scrutiny and/or interference, regulation that is designed to protect informational privacy should focus on the post-data collection phase (e.g. data analysis, inference and implementation phases).
First, this article starts by discussing the ways in which the right to private inquiry protects the ideals of participatory democracy.The section that follows summarizes some of the technologies that institutions use to collect information about how individuals use content in interactive media. In the light of this ability of institutions to track almost every move individuals make when using interactive media, the next section raises the question of whether the current legal environment offers any protection for private inquiry.This section also explains the problems that existing federal laws are prone to in terms of protecting informational privacy.The final section analyzes recent legal cases, as well as the US Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (known as the PATRIOT Act) of 2001 to describe how the information about individuals that is collected by service and content providers in interactive media is subject to the scrutiny of third parties through subpoenas.
WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SHRINKAGE OF PRIVATE INQUIRY RIGHTS?
Since the pioneering article by Warren and Brandeis, which called for a principle that would protect individuals' 'right to be let alone' (1890), privacy has had many different definitions (Miller, 1971; Prosser, 1960) .The initial conceptualization of privacy in the Warren and Brandeis (1890) article focused on individuals' rights to have control over the use of their name and likeness. Such a conceptualization was in line with the increased conflicts between individuals and journalists who published images of individuals and used their names without their consent. 1 Many different conceptualizations of privacy have emerged since the Warren and Brandies (1890) article. By the 1930s, privacy advocates had already started to consider the right to privacy as constituting an important corollary of individuals' right to pursue happiness without being subject to unjustifiable intrusion of others (Justice Brandeis, dissenting opinion in Olmstead et al. v. United States, 1928; Marx, 1988) . Many commentators suggest that such intrusions not only infringe upon human dignity (Kang, 1998; Lessig, 1999) , but also chill individuals' ability to exercise such liberties as speaking and associating with others (Cohen, 2000; Murphy, 1996; Reiman, 1995; Schwartz, 1999) . Accordingly, in an environment of extensive surveillance, individuals will be less likely to associate with 'controversial' others and engage in 'subversive' speech out of the fear of being subject to ridicule, censure and even economic harms such as denial of jobs orbenefits (Baruh and Popescu, 2003; Marx, 1988) . As Schwartz (1999) argues, our content consumption over cyberspace is prone to such chilling effects of surveillance more than it is in physical space. Because our actions in cyberspace leave finely grained trails, the perceived risks associated with digitally accessing a subversive text, whether it is erotic movies recorded on a PVR, or a website on making bombs, is much higher than consuming the same content in real space.
Following the revolutionary advances in information technologies and datamining techniques, especially after the penetration of the internet, both as a commercial and a political venue, privacy scholars started emphasizing individuals' right to control the flow of information about them. Information about our media consumption behavior, especially when combined with other types of data such as our political affiliations, threatens our right to receive information in several ways other than chilling our ability to access subversive texts.
First, by combining these separate sources of information, marketers and content providers can create profiles that help predict the preferences of individuals (Cohen, 1996) .These profiles can then be used to tailor product packages that a customer is more likely to accept (Baruh, 2004; Gandy, 2001;  New Media & Society 9(2) Phillips, 2001) . Such an ability to predict individuals' preferences may result in what Zarsky (2002 Zarsky ( , 2004 calls 'autonomy traps': with the purpose of manipulating individuals, institutions will increasingly design messages according to what individuals are more likely to accept, rather than what they actually need in order to make an informed decision (Gandy, 1996) .
In addition to depriving individuals of information that they may need to make 'informed decisions', the ability to profile individuals is also likely to decrease the variety of information that individuals will be exposed to. Such a uniform flow of information is likely to fragment the population into different segments that will be less likely to be exposed to the opinions of other subgroups in the population Turow, 1997) . A possible consequence of this lack of intercommunication between different segments of the population is group polarization. As members of different factions are increasingly exposed to views that are attitude congruent, their opinions may move to a point where group members share a view that is more extreme than the initial views of most of the members (Sunstein, 2001; Turner, 1991) .
The profiling and segmentation capabilities of institutions also mean that certain segments of the population will be excluded from products, services and deliberation processes (Cohen, 2000; Danna and Gandy, 2002; Howard et al., 2005; Lyon 2001 ).The concept of price discrimination provides a perfect example of how this process of exclusion would work. A close to perfect price discrimination, which would rely on extensive use of personal information, has been touted as the most efficient way of getting rid of deadweight loss, increasing efficiency and reducing costs for both the suppliers and the consumers (Bell, 1998; Hardy, 1996; O'Rourke, 1995) . Certainly, such a claim draws a very incomplete picture of the rationale behind price discrimination.The increased emphasis on customer relationship management (CRM), which focuses on maximizing income from the customers that are more likely to bring long-term profits, means that companies will charge higher prices to certain segments of the population that are deemed commercially unviable in order to 'fire' these customers (Danna and Gandy, 2002) . This process of exclusion, which is also frequently seen in the political realm, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when those who have been deemed less likely to respond appropriately and hence excluded from the streams of information are most likely to be the people who need that information the most (Gandy, 2000 (Gandy, , 2001 (Gandy, , 2002 Lyon, 2001; McCahill, 1998) .To the extent that political participation is a social interaction that has certain conventions that need to be practiced, it is also possible to expect that excluded agents will be deprived of the opportunities to practice and develop the valuable conventions of interaction. In the end, lacking the knowledge and the skills to participate in political deliberation, excluded groups may cease to seek opportunities for democratic participation (Baruh and Popescu, 2003) .
Baruh: Shrinkage of privacy
The final threat this section discusses was hinted at in the introduction in the hypothetical story of Khalid, who was detained in the airport because he was profiled as a high-risk flyer for reasons unknown to him. Information about Khalid's degree, news consumption habits and book purchases, when combined and interpreted out of the context within which they were collected, prompted an alarm that possibly resulted in both emotional and financial harm. Before this investigation, Khalid would have never classified any of the behaviors that may have prompted his detainment as subversive or harmful. However, to the extent that he can extrapolate the possible causes of such an incident from the questions that the officer asked him, he might reach to the conclusion that anything he does, regardless of how innocuous it may seem to him, may not be so in the eyes of others.This was the case for Maher Arar, who was promoted to the top of the terror watch list and eventually arrested at JFK Airport because of a series of coincidences, which included accidentally meeting with someone who was also on the list and buying a ticket to Tunisia to visit his wife's parents (Brzezinski, 2004) .
In such an environment, the aforementioned concept of the chilling effect, which validly focuses on individuals' tendency to refrain from reading subversive texts or making subversive comments, does not provide an adequate conceptualization of how surveillance regulates behavior. As Solove (2001 Solove ( , 2004 explains, while surveillance still inhibits certain types of behavior, the real threat to individual autonomy stems from individuals' failure to anticipate which behaviors will be considered as threatening, worth further scrutiny and interference.The contemporary surveillance that increasingly relies on interpretation of personal information strips individuals of any control over the process of data collection, collation and interpretation.The individual is left to bear the consequences (e.g. detainment in the airport, being denied insurance) of this often automated process without the ability to know and challenge the reasons for the inferences. Essentially, the individual ends up knowing much less about themselves than the surveillance agent (Marx, 2004) , not only because the surveillance agent has an electronic memory that rarely fades, but also because it is the surveillance agent (whether automated or not) that decides which aspects of an individual's identity are relevant in a specific context.
PRIVATE INQUIRY AS COROLLARY OF FREE SPEECH
In his Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-government, Meiklejohn (1948) argues that individuals' ability to think for themselves is an important prerequisite for self-governance. According to him, in free speech 'the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers ' (1948: 21) . Accordingly, only to the extent that an individual's right to read is protected will that individual be able to expose themselves to information New Media & Society 9(2) that they need in order to form their opinions, govern themselves and create new information (Benkler, 2002; Cohen, 1996 Cohen, , 1998 Cohen, , 2000 National Research Council, 2002) .
While the first amendment only incidentally recognizes the rights of the readers, legal precedents establish a concrete understanding of the connection between the right to read, watch and listen and the right to speak (Baruh, 2004; Cohen, 1996) . In Griswold et al. v. Connecticut (1965) , for example, the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut was charged with violating a statute that made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense. According to this statute, 'any person who assists . . . another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender' (quoted in Griswold et al. v. Connecticut, 1965) .The charges were dropped by the US Supreme Court, which held that the right to free speech entailed not only the right to utter or to print, but also 'the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry' (Griswold et al. v. Connecticut, 1965) . Later, the US Supreme Court reached a similar decision by ruling that the Board of Education's attempts to remove books from a school library would threaten students' First Amendment rights to have access to information (Board of Education et al. v. Pico, 1982) .
Another area where the right to receive has been recognized as an impotant corollary of speech has been regulation of obscenity. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969) , for example, the US Supreme Court held that the right to satisfy one's intellectual and emotional needs was protected by the First and the Fourteenth Amendment and was more compelling than the state's interest in enforcing its obscenity statutes. More recently, several court decisions regarding the attempts to regulate obscenity over the internet argued that despite government's compelling interest in regulating obscenity to protect children, the nature of the regulation should not impede on the ability of individuals to receive information (ACLU et al. v. Ashcroft, 2003; ACLU et al. v. Johnson, 1998; Reno et al. v. ACLU et al., 1997) .
As the previous section explained, unless individuals are able to receive information in an environment that is free from the ungranted scrutiny of others, they will not be able to practice their right to receive without any fear of embarrassment and harassment (Columbia Insurance Company v. Seescandy.com, Sees Candys et al.,1999) . For example, even a seemingly simple procedure, such as requiring a credit card number to verify a website's users' age, may chill individuals' access to information that is protected by the First Amendment (ACLU et al. v. Ashcroft, 2003; ACLU et al. v. Johnson, 1998) . Accordingly, what Julie named as 'intellectual privacy' ensures that individuals can explore ideas that they would otherwise refrain from exploring in the presence of other individuals or entities.This need to protect individuals' intellectual privacy has been recognized by the Supreme Baruh: Shrinkage of privacy Court of Colorado, which reversed a court order compelling Tattered Cover Inc., a bookstore, to disclose data regarding the book purchase history of a customer. Citing letters from Tattered Cover customers, who explained that they were using the bookstore because of its explicit promise to keep customer data private, the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that such warrants would pose a 'substantial chilling effect on the willingness of its customers to purchase controversial books' (Tattered Cover Inc., v. The City of Thornton, 2002) .
This decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado, which clearly recognizes how keeping track of which books individuals read may chill their intellectual freedom, echoes the longstanding confidentiality policies of the American Library Association (ALA). Noting that these confidentiality policies are becoming increasingly important in the aftermath of the US PATRIOT Act of 2001, ALA explains that each attempt to identify individuals who checked out a book leads to an 'even larger voluntary curtailment of expression by those who seek to avoid controversy or unwelcome scrutiny by government officials' (ALA, 2004) . Moreover, the ALA recognizes that in such an environment, the only realistic way to protect private inquiry is to minimize the collection of personally identifiable records and routinely destroy these records.
With the recent advances in technology, it becomes increasingly impossible to ignore how interactive media would pose similar threats to an individuals' right to private inquiry.This threat was recognized in as early as 1984 when the US Congress noted the 'enormous capacity' of '[c]able systems, particularly those with a "two-way" capability . . . to collect and store personally identifiable information about each cable subscriber' and reveal 'details about bank transactions, shopping habits, political contributions, viewing habits and other significant personal decisions' (US Congress, 1984) .
TRACKING CONTENT CONSUMPTION AND BEYOND: DATA COLLECTION IN INTERACTIVE MEDIA
Broadly speaking, the term interactive media refers to computer-driven communication systems that enable real-time exchange of content between multiple parties.Two important characteristics of the interactive media are their ability to facilitate a two-way flow of communication and their potential to track and store every bit of information about individuals' uses of the system (McAllister and Turow, 2002) .
The internet, with its easy to use world wide web interface, is the most widely used form of interactive medium and not surprisingly, numerous methods can be used to track individuals' content consumption online.The most widely known of these techniques are cookies.The standard web browsers that individuals use to surf the world wide web are designed to allow websites to place these cookies on individuals' computers so that in New Media & Society 9(2) their subsequent logging on to these websites, the website will be able to recognize them via the cookie. Unless an individual is technologically literate enough to search for those cookies in their computer, cookies are invisible to website visitors.What cookies do is to assign a unique identifier to a computer so that the website can track and store on a database the actions of an individual who has used that website (Phillips, 2001) , as well as collecting information about how the individual arrived at the website and what their destination was (Regan, 2002) . Once set in a computer, in addition to tracking content use, cookies can also be used to transfer data about how an individual uses a website to third parties without that individuals' consent or knowledge (Baruh, 2004; Pennington, 2001) .
In addition to cookies, web bugs are increasingly being used by websites and internet marketing companies to collect information about individuals. By 2000, close to 16 million of 51 million pages analyzed by an internet security company called Intelytics Inc. had at least one web bug that was installed on the webpage by a third party such as Doubleclick (Olsen, 2001 ). These web bugs are transparent images files, usually 1-by-1 in pixel size, and can be used to track many aspects of individuals' internet surfing habits, as well as determining which type of banner ads to run on one's screen.
Clearly, cookies, java applets and web bugs do not exhaust the list of what has been appropriately coined as spyware. Many other ways can be used to install programs that spy on individuals' computer use. For example, shareware programs that we often install in our computers are frequently bundled with spyware that peek into our computers. In a similar vein, both the software and the hardware that are provided by broadband internet service providers such as Comcast are designed to compile a list of the IP addresses of the websites that we visit (Baruh, 2004) . In fact, a recent Spy Audit by Earthlink has shown that on average each personal computer has 28 spyware programs (Earthlink Spy Audit, 2004) .These spyware programs usually have many talents other than tracking internet use. For example, E-blaster, a basic spyware program that is available in the consumer market for less than a $100, promises parents, jealous spouses and suspicious employers the ability to track every move that their target makes on their computers. Once installed in a computer, this program forwards the users every email that their target reads and composes, records chats and instant messages, keeps track of websites visited, and records every keystroke that their target makes. Conveniently enough, these programs allow their users to perform these functions, including the installation of the program, from a remote location. Now let's assume that we are a frequent user of copyrighted digital content such as electronic documents, e-books, MP3s and movies. Clearly, our interests in copyrighted content make us a target for various digital rights management (DRM) systems. As Litman (2002) argues, recent years have witnessed a change in the discourse about copyrights. Increasingly, the concern has shifted away from ensuring a balance between providing incentives to authors and facilitating public access to providing the author with full control over the content.The proponents of this approach contend that in the digital age of flawless copies, the only way to provide authors with incentives to produce is to grant them sustained control over every use of their content (cited in Burk and Cohen, 2001; Cohen, 1996; Lessig, 1999; Litman, 2002) . DRM systems aim to provide the copyright holders with such sustained control over content. Some of these management systems include encryption technologies that make it impossible to open a product without an access key (Bell, 1998) . Another option that copyright holders frequently employ to manage digital content is to anchor specific content to a single machine (National Research Council, 2002) . Many digital content providers rely on a combination of these two systems to make it possible for the content provider to 'specify that a consumer could read a document but not print it, save an unencrypted copy, or e-mail a part . . . to a friend ' (2002: 104) . Copyright owners often use such DRM systems in combination with licensing, not only for the purposes of preventing piracy but also to sidestep copyright doctrines, such as first sale and fair use, that protect the intellectual freedom of individuals who use their content (Jackson, 2001; Lessig, 1999; Lessig, 2004; Reidenberg, 1998) .
Recent DRM systems, however, not only encrypt and/or anchor documents, but also track how individuals use copyrighted content (Bell, 1998) . Watermarks, for example, can be embedded into the copyrighted content in order to detect certain actions so that the copyright holder can seek legal redress in cases when an infringement has taken place (National Research Council, 2002) .These watermarking systems vary in terms of their visibility and their ability to collect personally identifiable information.While a copyright holder can use a visible watermark to deter an individual from infringing the terms of use, watermarks can also be designed to go undetected by users (National Research Council, 2002) . More importantly, watermarks can accommodate additional information that can act as a fingerprint that identifies a certain user without the knowledge of that user.
A close look at the burgeoning digital music services such as the new Napster.com, Connect.com and iTunes reveals how the DRM systems mentioned above may be used.The license agreements of these online music stores impose strict limitations on how an individual may (or more appropriately may not) use a downloaded song. Once a customer downloads a song from these music stores, they cannot burn the track into the same playlist for more than the number of times allowed by the license, copy the content from a portable player to other computers, transfer their rights to another person or engage in any act that transforms the licensed content. Given these restrictions, one can infer that the downloads from Napster.com may use DRM systems that will count the number of times an individual burns a song into a CD; keep track of other songs that are burned into the New Media & Society 9(2) same CD; keep track of the number of times a certain combination of songs have been burned into a CD; and track the copies that an individual makes on the portable device. 2 At this point, it is important to note that there have also been attempts to embed similar tracking devices on music CDs that we buy from music stores. For example, Charley Pride's CD, A Tribute to Jim Reeves, released in May 2001, became one of the first audio CDs to utilize the SunnComm content security feature that prevented the consumers from burning or copying the CD or playing the CD on some MP3 players. More importantly, when the customers tried to play the CD on their personal computers, they were forwarded to a website that asked their name, full address and email address. After the realization that such devices were embedded in the CD, a California resident pursued a class action against Fahrenheit Entertainment and its affiliate Music City Records.The plaintiff argued that these DRM devices violated privacy rights by tracking listening habits. In an out of court settlement, Fahrenheit Entertainment and Music City Records agreed to cease gathering personal information and to purge the data that had already been gathered (Baruh, 2004; Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2002) .
The proliferation of different methods of data collection means that an important problem that collectors and users of such data have to address is finding ways to collate data dispersed in different databases. Data mining is the most frequently used method of assembling and creating knowledge out of data dispersed in different databases.The foremost purpose of any data mining or data matching effort is the extraction of meaningful patterns that can be used to predict future behavior (Baruh, 2004; Gandy, 2002) . Data mining systems -such as the ones that were utilized by the now cancelled Total Information Awareness Program or its short-lived successor, the MATRIXcan combine and analyze data from dispersed (both private and governmental) databases. Data mining systems employ different methods to extract meaningful information from these separate data. One such method is to use clustering methods to divide the individuals listed in the database into relatively homogenous segments. Another approach, associational rules, uses algorithms to search the database for patterns that might reveal an association between two variables (Zarsky, 2002 (Zarsky, , 2004 . Many content and technology providers in interactive media, which personalize content for individuals (e.g. TiVO, Amazon.com, nytimes.com) use market basket analysis or shopping cart analysis methods that rely on such associational rules. For example, Amazon.com uses these associational rules to determine what might be of interest to an individual based on the data that they have about people who have purchased or scanned through similar products.
This ability to match dispersed data poses a 'synergistic threat' to privacy by combining data to create predictive profiles about individuals (Kang, 1998 (Kang, : 1240 .
Baruh: Shrinkage of privacy
That is why, given institutions' increased ability to survey the media consumption habits of individuals, the question of whether the legal environment accommodates the protection of the individuals' right to be left alone when consuming content over interactive media becomes an important one.
(LACK OF) LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE INQUIRY IN INTERACTIVE MEDIA
According to section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, cable companies were required to either scramble or block channels that offered sexually explicit content. By blocking these channels and requiring subscribers to opt-in for access to such content, section 505 aimed to protect children from exposure to obscene material.This section was first challenged in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. et al. v. Federal Communications Commission (1996) , where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia argued that many subscribers would refrain from requesting access to sexually explicit content because of their fears that the operator would disclose its subscriber list. A similar decision was reached in United States et al. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., (2000) . After accepting the argument that the government had a legitimate interest in protecting children from offensive content, the court decided against requiring subscribers to opt in for access to sexual content and ruled it was not the alternative that was the least restrictive in terms of subscribers' right to have access to a specific content.The court suggested that rather than requiring subscribers to opt in for access to sexual content, opt-out options had the potential to serve the same purposes without requiring individuals to disclose their identification and their interest in 'offensive content'.
While the decisions summarized above signal some recognition of the need to protect private inquiry in interactive media, it should be stated that the realization of such a right depends on individuals' abilities to control the flow of information about them. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive law that protects individuals' informational privacy rights in the USA. Instead, Congress has relied on a combination of piecemeal legislation and industry self-regulation to protect personal data. Currently, there are three major pieces of legislation -the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or GLBA); the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 -that aim to protect informational privacy. What is shared by all the existing laws, besides their tendency to create confusion among consumers, is that they only regulate institutions' use of personally identifiable data. In other words, once the data has been stripped of personally identifiable information, the institutions are New Media & Society 9(2) free to share their databases with third parties. For example, according to the GLBA, 'information that does not identify a consumer, such as . . . blind data that does not contain personal identifiers such as account numbers, names, or addresses' is not covered by the statute (Charkow, 2003: 196) . In a similar vein, the CPPA requires business entities to give notice to customers only about the use of personally identifiable information (Norian, 2003) .
While protecting personally identifiable information is an important beginning, and for many it might seem sufficient, it should be noted that it is certainly possible to produce profiles about a specific person (or groups of people) and act upon that profile without personally identifying individuals. How can institutions act upon individuals without using personally identifiable information? First, institutions may develop detailed profiles about individuals without even sharing personally identifiable information. Phillips (2001) explains that when institutions share a specific algorithm (hash fields) that is used to convert indexical data (e.g. John) into a random identification number (e.g. ID145), it will be possible for these institutions to share data about a specific person without using indexical identification. Once such a profile is developed, an institution may use it and make decisions regarding whether to exclude an individual and how to tailor messages without having to identify the individual (Baruh, 2004; Philips, 2001 Philips, , 2002 . Second, as discussed in the preceding sections, data mining techniques often use market basket analysis, which enables institutions to make inferences about an individual based on analyses of how others who are similar to them behave. For example, even when an individual surfs expedia.com for the first time (so there is no information about their previous behavior), expedia.com can make inferences about that individual based on how they surf the site and how others, whose surfing behavior resembled theirs, behaved when purchasing the ticket (did they look for other bargains?).
As mentioned in the first section, this ability of institutions to create profiles about individuals may result in the exclusion of certain groups from products, services and deliberation processes. Moreover, the concept of the autonomy trap mentioned earlier underlines the possibility that information that individuals receive will increasingly be oriented towards manipulating them rather than informing them. Finally, as also mentioned earlier, the relative invisibility of data mining and profiling processes creates an environment of uncertainty within which data subjects neither know nor can challenge the ways in which institutions use personal information to make inferences about them and make decisions regarding their physical, financial, emotional and intellectual prospects. Despite these problems, however, the existing privacy legislation only protects personally identifiable information. As long as these institutions do not 'act upon the individual' that is described by this data, they will be able to utilize the data to create Baruh: Shrinkage of privacy profiles and 'construct pricing schemes, risk management schemes, persuasive ads' (Phillips, 2001: 15) .
Given such a legal environment, it should not be surprising that institutions share an extensive amount of data about individuals.The methods of sharing and the claims about the legitimate need to share data vary. Apple's iTunes, for example, states that they may 'occasionally share your personal contact information with carefully selected technology companies, to keep you informed about related products and services'. Napster, in a similar way, explains that they might share de-identified data with third parties and partners. Another way that the information we submit to technology and content providers will spill over to the databases of unintended parties is through mergers and takeovers. Amazon.com's privacy statement explains that, as they continue to develop their business, they may sell some of their stores or buy new ones. According to the privacy statement, personal information is generally one of the assets that will be transferred in such transactions.
In addition to these methods of sharing data, technology and content providers are increasingly being compelled through subpoenas to share personal information with third parties. In fact, Schiesel (2003) suggests that the number of subpoenas that a large telecommunications company receives reaches hundreds per year.The next section will describe some of the developments that extend the ability of certain private and governmental institutions to serve subpoenas to other institutions so that they can access the information that they have in their databases.
LEGAL SUBPOENAS AND UNGRANTED SPILLOVER OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Trying to figure out if Kent Hovind, an internet radio host, had evaded taxes since the 1970s as he claimed in his show, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served Cox Cable Communications a subpoena to access Hovind's account information. Cox Cable refused to comply, arguing that under Section 551 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, government agencies, including the IRS, should provide compelling evidence of wrongdoing in order to obtain such information (United States of America v. Cox Cable, 1998).The court disagreed with the IRS's claim that it was exempt from this clause, but still granted the subpoena on the basis that the IRS had met this requirement by showing that the Hovind family was earning an income and had failed to file taxes since 1991.
The test of compelling evidence that was used in United States v. Cox Cable (1998) was also used in several other cases where the plaintiffs served subpoenas to get the identification of a user (or multiple users) of an internet service provider (ISP). In one such case, Dentrite Inc. sought to get access to the identification of an individual who posted comments that allegedly New Media & Society 9(2) harmed the company's reputation, led to a decrease in its stock value and were based on misappropriated trade secrets.The court denied Dendrite's motion on the basis that Dendrite did not provide sufficient evidence to establish harm (Dendrite International, Inc., v. Doe No. 3, 2001) . In another case,TMRT (2TheMart.com Inc.) sought to identify 23 speakers who had allegedly used the bulletin boards of Infospace to post messages that harmed the company's reputation and led to a drop in its stock values. Arguing that 'Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas', the court asked TMRT to prove damages before deciding whether to grant the subpoena demanding the identification of the 23 Infospace users (John Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 2001) .
Recent developments, such as Apple recently suing several online publications in order to access the identification of individuals who leaked Apple's plans about the products they released in 2005, however, have an important potential to reverse the tendency of courts to request proof of damage or malice before deciding on whether to grant or deny motion. An important cornerstone of this possible reversal has been the application of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 to a legal skirmish between Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and Verizon Internet Services. On July 2002, the RIAA served a subpoena to Verizon in order to obtain the identification of an internet subscriber, who allegedly shared more than 600 copyrighted songs over a peer-to-peer (p2p) filesharing platform.The RIAA argued that under the DMCA, it had the authority to issue a pre-litigation subpoena to any service provider to identify an alleged infringer.What is important to note at this point is that, unlike in previous cases where the courts asked for a proof of malice before considering whether to grant or deny motion, under the DMCA the copyright owner does not have to prove any wrongdoing to issue the subpoena. In exchange, all the copyright holder is required to do is to have a 'good faith belief that the use of the material . . . is not authorized' and to promise that it will use the information only for the purposes of protecting rights (Recording Industry Association of America v.Verizon Internet Services, 2003a Services, , 2003b . 3 In April 2003, the District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the above-mentioned steps are sufficient to protect the anonymous speech and inquiry rights of individuals who are not infringing copyrights, denied Verizon's motion to quash. Interestingly enough, only a few pages after arguing that the DMCA had the necessary safeguards to protect individuals' First Amendment rights, the court explained that the DMCA may 'impact some protected expression . . . in that the threat of subpoena under the DMCA . . . could discourage some Internet users from otherwise protected activity' (Recording Industry Association of America v.Verizon Internet Services, 2003b). However, the court argued, it is not enough for this threat to be real: it should also substantially show that the DMCA has gone overboard.
The April 2003 decision of the District of Columbia is a case in point that demonstrates how fragile the balance between individuals' private inquiry rights and copyright holders' property rights is.While the copyright holders''good faith belief ' is enough to trigger a series of legal actions to pursue what may be a largely unsupported claim,'real' concerns about First Amendment Rights of individuals is deemed as insufficient so long as those real concerns are not also substantial in size. Moreover, the changes in the legal environment since this decision have shown how the balance is likely to turn further in favor of the interests of the copyright industry. This bill aimed to 'facilitate the sharing among law enforcement agencies, Internet service providers and copyright owners of information concerning acts of copyright infringement'.While the DMCA required a subpoena for such information sharing among different institutions, this bill does not require any court orders or subpoenas and does not specify the type of information that the service providers will share through this program.
Another legal skirmish that demonstrates how the information that is collected by institutions is vulnerable to the scrutiny of third parties is Paramount Pictures Corporation et al. v. ReplayTV, Inc., and Sonicblue Inc. (2002) . In 2001, as a response to increasing negative publicity about the data collection practices of TiVO, Sonicblue, another company that provides digital video recording (DVR) services, developed ReplayTV 4000, a DVR that did not collect any information about its customers. In 2002, however, claiming that the users of ReplayTV 4000 were sharing copyrighted content with others who have not paid for access to the content, Paramount Pictures Corporation and several other movie production companies demanded that Sonicblue turn over the data it had about its subscribers. Sonicblue responded to this demand by explaining that it never collected any information about its customers except for information about when the digital video recorders had technical malfunctions.
Following this response by Sonicblue, Paramount et al. demanded that the Sonicblue reengineer its product to collect data about how its subscribers used the ReplayTV. In April 2002, the Magistrate Judge ordered Sonicblue to implement, within 60 days, technologies that would enable the collection of this information and provide technical assistance to the plaintiffs so that New Media & Society 9(2) they could review the data (Paramount Pictures Corporation et al. v. ReplayTV, Inc., 2002) . A trial judge reversed this decision, explaining that the initial ruling was an impermissible mandatory injunction because it required the creation of new data that did not exist (Paramount Pictures Corporation et al. v. ReplayTV, Inc., 2002) . At this point, it is important to note that the decision against Paramount Pictures Corporation et al. was because ReplayTV did not have any information about its subscribers. However, there is no reason to believe that Paramount Pictures et al. could not have gained access to that information by a subpoena if ReplayTV had actually gathered information about the viewing habits of its subscribers (Baruh, 2004) .
This section so far has focused on the role of subpoenas in the spillover of information between private institutions. However, government agencies, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US World Trade Center, constitute an important constituency that has an increasing interest in having access to media consumption habits of individuals. One of the most noteworthy examples of how the government seeks to maximize its scrutiny of individuals' lives is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/ Information Awareness Office's invitation for projects that will increase the surveillance capabilities of law enforcement agencies by combining all available databases in order to automatically identify possible threats through the use of predictive schemes (2002) . In 2003, the US Congress cancelled the Total Information Awareness Program as a response to the growing criticism. However, the US government, both at the federal and the state level, continues to mine data that is kept in governmental as well as private databases. A recent report by the United States General Accounting Office (2004), for example, found that 52 of the 128 federal agencies have already implemented, or are planning to implement, data mining techniques.These departments reported 199 data mining efforts, including MATRIX, which equip the enrolled states with the ability to store and share sensitive data, not only among themselves but also with the federal government.
In addition to these various data mining programs, the US PATRIOT Act of 2001 creates an environment that supports the implementation of surveillance practices that will scrutinize every aspect of individuals' lives.The first of these amendments concerns law enforcement agencies' ability to share information with each other. According to Section 203, any law enforcement officer or attorney for the government who is authorized to obtain the contents of any communication may share the contents of the communication with any other law enforcement, immigration, intelligence or national security officer.The only condition necessary for sharing the contents of an intercepted communication is that the content includes matters pertinent to foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence that will help the officials to perform their duties.
As well as increasing the ability of the government officials to share the content of communications that they intercept, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 expands the scope of media technologies that can be subject to government scrutiny and relaxes the judicial requirements for obtaining the permission to monitor these various electronic communication devices. For example, before the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, a law enforcement agent would have to secure a wiretap order that has very strict constitutional requirements. However, Section 209 of the Act relaxes these requirements by enabling law enforcement agencies to listen to someone's voicemail using a subpoena or a search warrant, which are far easier to obtain. Moreover, Section 206 of the Act enables government agencies to monitor any communication facility such as a phone line, a computer lab or a library without having to specify the name of the target of surveillance.This flexibility may often mean that individuals who share a communication facility with a possible target of such intelligence will also be under surveillance.
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 also extends the scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications. Section 210 accomplishes this deed by handing the government agencies the authority to ask for: (1) the subscriber identity or number and assigned IP addresses as well as the telephone or the instrument numbers; and (2) the means and sources of payment, such as the credit card numbers and bank account numbers. Finally, according to the provisions of Section 215, government agencies can compel any business to produce any material, including books, records and documents, regarding any topic, including medical history, credit ratings, book checkouts and travel records, for an investigation by certifying to a court that the investigation may reveal records that may be relevant to their intelligence investigations (ACLU, 2001; EPIC, 2002) .
The examples discussed in this section underline not only the possibility that unintended parties' use of subpoenas and court orders to access information about individuals' media use habits may chill consumption of 'subversive' texts, but also the increasing uncertainty regarding which behaviors trigger further scrutiny and interference. For example, as mentioned earlier, the DMCA allows the copyright holders to issue a subpoena as long as they suspect unauthorized use. As many scholars argue, these unauthorized, and usually private, uses have traditionally been protected as being under the category of unregulated use (Lessig, 2004; Litman, 2001) . Nowadays, however, many of these private uses, such as transforming content and making copies, are becoming prosecutable acts, adding to the uncertainty regarding the 'kosher' uses of content. In the end, whenever a new content delivery method such as Mercora (a p2p radio) emerges, the first question that potential users ask and the service providers try to answer is 'will they sue me?' However, neither really knows the answer.The provisions of the PATRIOT Act of 2001 introduces similar uncertainties both by not specifying the types of behavior that are considered indicative of illegal activity and by making any New Media & Society 9(2) communication facility, such as a library or an internet café, a possible target of intelligence investigations.
CONCLUSION
Despite the legal recognition of the connection between the right to receive information without being scrutinized by others and effective communication, recent changes in the legal and the technological environment threaten this right by increasing institutions' ability to collect, share and collate data about individuals' media consumption habits.This article has identified several threats, such as chilling effects, discrimination (exclusion) and autonomy traps, that have been discussed in length by many privacy scholars (e.g. Cohen, 1996; Cohen, 2000; Danna and Gandy, 2002; Zarsky, 2004) . A more recent threat to privacy that this article focused on pertains to the uncertainty that surrounds the procedures that institutions use in order to identify 'threats' and 'prospects' and act on them.This uncertainty prevents data subjects from making any distinctions between 'risky' behavior and 'non-risky' behavior.
Uncertainty has always been an integral part of surveillance. In the case of Bentham's widely known, unrealized panopticon, for example, the prisoners' inability to determine when the guards were watching them was crucial for the effective control of prisoners' behaviors. However, this article has argued that the uncertainty that characterizes contemporary surveillance is much wider in scope: the data subject does not know when data is collected; who collects the data; who has access to the data; and who (or what) distinguishes acceptable behavior from risky behavior. As such, data subjects lose whatever control they used to have over the management of their multiple identities. Certainly, many scholars would argue that such a loss of control over identity management decreases the social costs that are associated with individuals' attempts to mislead others by concealing or misrepresenting their own identities (Posner, 1978; Singleton, 1998) . However, it is very difficult to argue that just because individuals may occasionally misrepresent themselves, the inferences that institutions make about individuals should gain such an absolute credence over individuals' self-representations.
Given this threat to individuals' ability to control how their identities are managed, the question of how individuals' will regain control over personal information becomes an important one. In addition to a combination of piecemeal legislation such as COPPA and HIPAA, there have been numerous proposals as to how individuals can protect their informational privacy. These proposals include use of privacy-enhancing technologies that will mediate the privacy demands of individuals with information demands of institutions (Froomkin, 2000; Lessig, 1999) ; creation of property rights over personal information (Laudon, 1996; Murphy, 1996; Rule and Lawrence, 1999) ; and industry self-regulation (for detailed discussion, see Froomkin, 2000) .
Baruh: Shrinkage of privacy
While space limitations prevent further elaboration of the advantages and the disadvantages of each of these proposals, the problems that were identified in this article point to an important criterion that informational privacy protection schemes should accommodate. Given the difficulty that individuals will face when trying to distinguish between 'subversive' and 'benign' behavior, this article will conclude by proposing that in order for information privacy protection schemes to function properly, we should also focus on regulating stages of data use that follow data collection (e.g. retention, collation, interpretation and implementation). For example, as hinted by the legal skirmishes between copyright holders and service providers, as long as personal information is collected and kept in a database, unintended, as well as intended, parties will access that information.This possibility, when combined with the above-mentioned problem of contextual integrity, requires the imposition of stricter limitations on how long collectors can retain personal information. Additionally, more emphasis is needed on assuring the accountability of processes that follow data collection. In addition to being able to assess the reliability of data, an individual should be able to learn about how that data is interpreted by humans or machines in order to assign them to different categories. Measures such as cookie viewers, which enable consumers to determine how they are assigned to different categories, provide a useful, albeit incomplete, prototype of how such systems could increase the chances that individuals know which pieces of information were combined to categorize them as a high-risk person and challenge that categorization (Zarsky, 2004) . Clearly, such systems suffer from important problems, not the least of which is the fact that individuals do not have enough bargaining power to challenge such decisions without risking exclusion from products and/or services. However, as additional sources of information -such as media consumption habits -expand the possible interpretations that institutions can make about individuals, a privacy protection scheme that goes beyond the regulation of data collection is needed. 3 The statute does not appear to impose any penalties on those who fail to fulfill their promises of using the data only for protecting their rights.
